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IN TBP UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 8 90148-CA 
v : 
SHAYNE EDWARD RHODES, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal is from a conviction for aggravated 
assault, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-5-103 (Supp. 1989). This Court has jurisdiction f ho,ir the 
appeal -- tah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(i (S~i: . 1989) because the 
appeal is from a district co • ! . ,i : .mindi case involving a 
third degree felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1 Whether the trial COUT * .:-• -i . t= discretion in 
denying defendant's motion for continuance to a lie-
substitution of < msei on the morning <-f trial. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The language of the provisions upon whi^h the ;^  
relies are included *** b..>dy of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with aggravated assault on April 
12, 1988 (Record [hereinafter R.] at 4). Trial for defendant was 
originally set for September 13-15, 1988, as a second setting; 
however, that setting was vacated at the request of defendant's 
counsel because of a scheduling conflict (R. at 25-28). 
Defendant was tried by jury on November 21-22, 1988, in the First 
Judicial District Court, in and for Cache County, the Honorable 
VeNoy Christoffersen, district judge, presiding, and was found 
guilty as charged (R. at 30 and 50). 
After a presentence investigation by the Department of 
Adult Probation and Parole, Judge Christoffersen sentenced 
defendant on December 27, 1988, to a term not to exceed five 
years in the Utah State Prison, and ordered him to pay 
restitution in the amount of $123,918.27, jointly and severally 
with the codefendant in this case (R. at 53-56 and Pre-sentence 
Investigation Report [hereinafter PSI] included in the record on 
appeal). Defendant filed a notice of appeal on January 23, 1989 
(R. at 63) . 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Because defendant's only claim on appeal was that he 
was denied the right to counsel, a statement of the facts 
supporting the charge against defendant will not be given. 
However, the trial transcript demonstrates that there was ample 
evidence to support the jury's verdict. 
On the day set for trial, defendant's retained counsel, 
Arden W. Lauritzen, asked for a conference in chambers before the 
trial commenced. At that conference, Mr. Lauritzen informed the 
trial court that defendant wished to address the court (Trial 
transcript [hereinafter T.] at 1; a copy of the transcript pages 
containing this conference is attached as Addendum A). At that 
conference, defendant told the trial court that he wanted a new 
lawyer because he had been in jail for six months and felt that 
Mr. Lauritzen had not made any motions to help defendant (T. at 
1). Defendant said that he had spoken to Gilbert Athay who had 
told him to dismiss Mr. Lauritzen and tell the court that Mr. 
Athay was not prepared to go to trial (T. at 1). 
The trial judge commented that the day of trial was an 
"inappropriate time" to decide to substitute counsel, and 
defendant responded that he had decided to change counsel two 
days after he got out of jail and that he had not spoken to his 
counsel since he had been released (T. at 1). According to the 
presentence report which is in the record of this case, defendant 
entered a plea of guilty to one count of misdemeanor assault in 
an unrelated charge on May 23, 1988 (PSI at 16). After an 
investigation by the Department of Adult Probation and Parole, 
defendant was sentenced on June 10, 1988, to a term of six months 
in the Cache County Jail (PSI at 19). Defendant served 158 days 
and was released on November 15, 1988, having served the full 
sentence on the misdemeanor with early release for good time (PSI 
at 19). November 15, 1988 was the Tuesday before the Monday 
trial date on the present charge. According to defendant's 
statement to the court, his decision to change counsel would have 
occurred on November 17, 1988, the Thursday before trial. 
The trial court conducted a colloquy with defendant 
asking why defendant had not acted sooner in retaining new 
counsel; defendant replied only that he did something as "soon as 
[he] got a chance" (T. at 2). Defendant told the court that Mr. 
Athay had contacted the judge's "secretary," but the court 
reiterated that the judge had not been contacted by Mr. Athay (T. 
at 2). The court also invited more information from defendant 
when the court said that defendant had not shown how Mr. 
Lauritzen had been derelict in representing defendant (T. at 2). 
Defendant said the record was devoid of anything that Mr. 
Lauritzen had "done to help [defendant] out" (T. at 2). 
Defendant complained that Mr. Lauritzen had not done anything to 
try to get the charge reduced and said that counsel for the 
codefendant had tried to get a reduction for the co-defendant (T. 
at 2-3). In response to the court's question about the success 
of codefendant's counsel, defendant admitted that they had been 
unsuccessful in getting a reduction in charge (T. at 3). 
Defendant then said that he did not feel that Mr. Lauritzen had 
done or would do anything for him (T. at 3). 
Based on defendant's generalized complaints about Mr. 
Lauritzen and the timing of the request, the trial court 
determined that the motion to continue the trial was only made 
for purposes of delay and denied it (T. at 3). The trial 
proceeded with Mr. Lauritzen representing defendant. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
It was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court 
to deny defendant's motion to continue trial when that motion was 
not made until the morning of trial. Defendant's request for 
continuance was based on a desire to substitute counsel. He had 
been represented for seven months by retained counsel and did not 
express any dissatisfaction with that counsel until the morning 
of trial. Defendant told the court that he had decided some four 
days before trial that he was going to seek other counsel but did 
not speak with substitute counsel until the Friday before the 
Monday trial date. 
When a defendant expresses dissatisfaction with his 
counsel, the court must balance defendant's right to counsel with 
the orderly procedures of the courts and the public's right to 
prompt and efficient administration of justice. Where, as here, 
defendant's dissatisfaction with counsel does not rise to a 
deprivation of his constitutional right to counsel, the trial 




THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO CONTINUE 
TRIAL WHEN THE MOTION WAS MADE THE DAY OF 
TRIAL AND DEFENDANT DID NOT GIVE LEGITIMATE 
GROUNDS FOR THE CONTINUANCE. 
The sole issue raised by defendant in this matter is 
his claim that he was denied the right to counsel of his choice 
which he claims is guaranteed by the sixth amendment to the 
United States Constitution and by article I, section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution (Brief of Appellant [hereinafter Br. of App.] 
at 3) (emphasis added). Based on that claim, he argues that the 
trial court erred by not "reasonably and non-suggestively" 
questioning defendant about his dissatisfaction with Mr. 
Lauritzen and not granting defendant's motion to continue trial 
to allow defendant "to retain counsel of his choice" (Br. of App. 
at 3) . 
A. Abuse of Discretion. 
The principal issue for this Court to decide in this 
matter is whether the trial court abused its discretion in 
denying defendant's motion to continue trial for purposes of 
substituting counsel. In the context of a motion to continue 
trial in order to secure the testimony of a codefendant after the 
codefendant's trial, the Utah Supreme Court Sdid: 
It is well established in Utah, as 
elsewhere, that the granting of a continuance 
is at the discretion of the trial judge, 
whose decision will not be reversed by this 
Court absent a clear abuse of that 
discretion. State v. Moosman, Utah, 542 P.2d 
1093 (1975). Abuse may be found where a 
party has made timely objections, given 
necessary notice and made a reasonable effort 
to have the trial date reset for good cause. 
Griffiths v. Hammon, Utah, 560 P.2d 1375 
(1977) . 
State v. Creviston, 646 P.2d 750, 752 (Utah 1982) (emphasis 
added). 
The United States Supreme Court addressed the issue of 
a denial of a motion to continue to allow certain counsel to be 
present at trial in Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1 (1983). In 
Slappy, counsel had been appointed for defendant. Just before 
trial, counsel had been hospitalized and another attorney from 
the same public defenders office was substituted. Defendant 
objected, but the new attorney assured the court that he was 
fully prepared to proceed with the trial, and the court denied 
the motion to continue trial. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
had overturned the conviction resulting from the trial, stating 
that defendant had "the right to a meaningful attorney-client 
relationship." j^ d. a t 13 (emphasis omitted). The Supreme Court 
reversed the Court of Appeals, stating that the sixth amendment 
guarantee of counsel did not include a right to a "meaningful 
relationship" between defendant and counsel. Rl. at 13-14. 
On the issue of the trial court's discretion in matters 
of continuance, the Court in Slappy also said: 
Trial judges necessarily require a great deal 
of latitude in scheduling trials. Not the 
least of their problems is that of assembling 
the witnesses, lawyers, and jurors at the 
same place at the same time, and this burden 
counsels against continuances except for 
compelling reasons. Consequently, broad 
discretion must be granted trial courts on 
matters of continuances; only an unreasoning 
and arbitrary "insistence upon 
expeditiousness in the face of a justifiable 
request for delay" violates the right to the 
assistance of counsel. 
Id. at 11-12 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court found that 
"it was far from an abuse of discretion to deny a continuance" in 
that case because substitute counsel had assured that court that 
he was prepared and ready for trial. The Court also noted that 
counsel had succeeded in getting a hung jury during defendant's 
first trial, in the face of "undisputed and overwhelming evidence 
of guilt." Ri. at 12. By implication, substitute counsel's able 
and effective representation of Slappy argued against an abuse of 
discretion in the trial court's denial of a continuance. See 
also Unqar v. Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, 589 (1964) ("The matter of 
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continuance is traditionally within the sound discretion of the 
trial judge"). 
The application of this case law to the present case 
will be discussed in the next subpoint. 
B. Right to Counsel. 
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution 
provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy 
the right . . . to have the Assistance of counsel for his 
defence." Article I, section 12 of the Utah Constitution 
provides: "In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the 
right to appear and defend in person and by counsel, . . . " 
Neither provision provides defendant with the right to counsel of 
his choice. 
The Utah Supreme Court addressed a situation similar to 
the present case in State v. Doherty, 29 Utah 2d 320, 509 P.2d 
351 (1973). In Doherty, defendant had retained counsel to 
represent him; after the commencement of trial, counsel had 
requested permission to withdraw and moved for a continuance. 
Counsel cited defendant's loss of confidence in counsel as reason 
to withdraw. The court denied both motions and the trial 
proceeded. Defendant sought reversal on the ground, inter alia, 
that the court erred in denying his motion to continue and for 
withdrawal of counsel. As to this claim of error, the Utah 
Supreme Court said: 
[T]he record fails to show that the defendant 
was not competently and adequately 
represented throughout the trial by his 
counsel and there is nothing in the record to 
indicate that the court below abused its 
discretion in failing to grant the 
defendant's motion. 
Doherty, 509 P.2d at 352 (footnote omitted). Obviously, in the 
balance between defendant's right to counsel and the court's 
discretion in matters of continuance, the fact that defendant was 
represented by competent counsel during trial must be given 
proper weight. 
More recently, the Utah Supreme Court dealt with a case 
involving a defendant's request for appointment of private 
counsel because he had no faith in the public defenders office. 
In State v. Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d 120 (Utah 1986), cert, denied, 
Wulffenstein v. Utah, 484 U.S. 803 (1987), the Court reiterated 
that "[a]n accused is entitled to employ counsel of his choice" 
or to have counsel appointed if he is indigent; however, he was 
not entitled to dismiss court-appointed counsel at will and 
expect the court to appoint a new one. Wulffenstein, 733 P.2d at 
121. The Court said: 
The accused is entitled to the effective 
assistance of a competent member of our bar 
who is willing to identify with the interests 
of the defendant and present the available 
defenses. . . . 
Id. at 121 (citations omitted). The Utah Supreme Court found 
that the trial court had not abused its discretion, "considering 
counsel's willingness and ability and defendant's conjectured 
excuses for rejection." Ijd. at 121. 
This Court addressed the question of whether a trial 
court abused its discretion in refusing to appoint new counsel 
for a dissatisfied defendant in State v. Pursifell, 746 P.2d 270 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987). This case is cited by defendant in support 
of his arguments but is factually different from the case now 
before this Court. In Pursifell, counsel had been appointed for 
defendant, not retained; in addition, Pursifell did not ask for a 
continuance to retain new counsel but asked the court to appoint 
substitute counsel. These differences between the Pursifell case 
and the present case apply specifically to the duty-to-inquire 
issue which defendant cites in his brief. 
Certain basic premises to be followed in a request for 
substitute counsel were given by this Court in Pursifell. 
Typically, motions for substitute counsel 
are less likely to be granted when they would 
result in a significant delay or mistrial or 
would otherwise impede the prompt 
administration of justice. . . . Courts are 
also aware of the propensity for manipulation 
of the process by criminal defendants and 
some have cautioned that "requests for 
appointment of a new attorney on the eve of 
trial should not become a vehicle for 
achieving delay." 
Id. at 273 (citations omitted). With that background, this Court 
then spoke of a trial court's duty in the case of appointed 
counsel to inquire into the nature of the complaint if a 
defendant has expressed dissatisfaction. 
The distinction between the appointed counsel in 
Pursifell and the retained counsel in the present case is 
significant. In cases such as Pursifell, the court has appointed 
counsel for defendant, defendant has not chosen his own. If a 
defendant then expresses dissatisfaction with appointed counsel, 
it is incumbent upon the trial court to inquire and determine 
whether the defendant's relationship with his 
or her appointed attorney has deteriorated to 
the point that sound discretion requires 
substitution or even to such an extent that 
his or her Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
would be violated but for substitution. 
Id. at 273. In the circumstance of appointed counsel, the court 
chose the counsel for a defendant and is obligated to assure that 
the counsel which the court provided does not deny a defendant's 
constitutional right to the assistance of counsel. 
On the other hand, as in the present case, defendant 
has chosen and retained his own counsel. If he becomes 
dissatisfied with his counsel, he can retain other counsel. In 
the present case, the trial court did not deny defendant's right 
to retain substitute counsel, the court merely refused to 
continue the trial and release defendant's original counsel (T. 
at 3). Had there been a quick setting of the trial in this 
matter so that defendant had not been allowed sufficient time to 
decide whether he was dissatisfied with Mr. Lauritzen's 
representation, it may have been an abuse of discretion to deny 
the continuance. However, that was not the case. The charging 
document was filed on April 12, 1988 (R. at 4). A notice of 
preliminary hearing was issued on April 26, 1988, at which time 
A. W. Lauritzen was listed as attorney for defendant (R. at 15). 
On May 27, 1988, the public defender, Robert Gutke, was allowed 
to withdraw, and Mr. Lauritzen was listed as counsel at the 
preliminary hearing (R. at 16). Mr. Lauritzen represented 
defendant at the arraignment on June 13, 1988, and sought the 
vacation of a second setting for defendant's trial based on 
scheduling conflicts (R. at 24-27). Trial was set for, and 
commenced, on November 21, 1988 (R. at 30). From April 26, when 
Mr. Lauritzen was first listed as defendant's counsel, to 
November 21, the date of trial, is a period of seven months. If 
Mr. Lauritzen had given defendant grounds to seek another 
attorney, the substitution could have been effected much earlier 
than the morning of trial. 
After discussing a duty to inquire into reasons for 
requesting new counsel, this Court in Pursifell addressed the 
standard for determining when substitution of counsel is 
mandated. This Court said: 
Substitution of counsel is mandatory when the 
defendant has demonstrated good cause, such 
as a conflict of interest, a complete 
breakdown of communication, or an 
irreconcilable conflict with his or her 
attorney. . . . When a defendant is forced to 
stand trial "with the assistance of an 
attorney with whom he has become embroiled in 
an irreconcilable conflict," he is deprived 
of the "effective assistance of any counsel 
whatsoever" and his Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel is violated. 
Pursifell, 746 P.2d at 274 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
This Court went on to hold that the reasons for dissatisfaction 
stated by Pursifell were "not so substantial as to rise to a 
constitutional level." Ld. at 274. Pursifell, when asked the 
basis for his dissatisfaction, mentioned that he had met with 
counsel only once and that he had not received notice of a 
discovery hearing. The Court noted: 
The charges against defendant and the 
factual setting in which they arose would be 
a matter of routine for an experienced 
criminal defense attorney. Multiple 
interviews might have given defendant more of 
a sense that a committed advocate was 
diligently working on his behalf, but would 
not necessarily have furthered his cause. 
Id. at 274, n. 2. This Court affirmed Pursifell's convictions, 
findings that his complaints were insubstantial, and that 
[w]hile it might have been preferrable [sic] 
to delve deeper into defendant's arguable 
claim of inadequate preparation, the failure 
to do so was neither a constitutional 
violation nor an abuse of discretion. 
Id. at 274. 
The inquiry made in the Pursifell case was similar to 
the one made in the present case. The trial judge asked 
defendant the reasons for his dissatisfaction with the counsel 
which had represented him for seven months. Defendant complained 
that his attorney had not helped him because he had been in jail 
for six months. Given that defendant was in jail because of a 
six month sentence on a totally separate assault charge, the 
court properly concluded that that was not a valid complaint 
about Mr. Lauritzen's representation (T. at 1). Defendant's 
second complaint was that attorneys for the codefendant had tried 
to get charges reduced against the codefendant; defendant claimed 
that Mr. Lauritzen had not made the same effort. As the trial 
court pointed out, the codefendant's attorneys had not been 
successful in getting charges reduced (indeed, the codefendant 
pled guilty as charged and testified for the State at defendant's 
trial) (T. at 2-3 and 83-131). 
As the court told defendant, Mr. Lauritzen was present 
for trial and prepared to give defendant the help he needed (T. 
at 2). The trial record demonstrates that Mr. Lauritzen ably and 
competently conducted a defense for defendant. Given the 
overwhelming evidence against defendant, Mr. Lauritzen presented 
the best defense possible. This capable representation of 
defendant by Mr. Lauritzen confirms that defendant's right to the 
assistance of counsel was not violated. 
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Cases from other jurisdictions also provide guidance in 
determining whether the trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to continue denied defendant a sixth amendment right. As 
the United States Supreme court said in Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. 45 (1932), "[i]t is hardly necessary to say that, the right 
to counsel being conceded, a defendant should be afforded a fair 
opportunity to secure counsel of his own choice." Powell, 287 
U.S. at 53 (emphasis added). In Chandler v. Fretag, 348 U.S. 3 
(1954), the Court said: 
A necessary corollary is that a defendant 
must be given a reasonable opportunity to 
employ and consult with counsel; otherwise, 
the right to be heard by counsel would be of 
little worth. 
348 U.S. at 10 (emphasis added). The trial court's obligation to 
allow criminal defendants to retain counsel falls under a 
reasonableness standard. The court is not required to give a 
defendant unlimited time to seek counsel. 
The right to seek and retain counsel of one's choice is 
not an unfettered right however. In United Scates v. Nichols, 
841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988), a case arising out of the 
District Court of Utah, the court said: 
But the right to choice of counsel is not 
absolute. . . . A court may restrict a 
defendant's choice when allowing the 
defendant to be represented by a particular 
attorney would adversely affect an important 
public interest. . . . A court may not, 
however, "arbitrarily refuse to allow the 
defendant to retain the lawyer of his 
c h o i c e . " . . . 
841 F.2d at 1502 (emphasis added). Accord United States v. 
Padilla, 819 F.2d 952, 955-56 (10th Cir. 1987); Urquhart v. 
Lqckhart, 726 F.2d 1316, 1319 (8th Cir. 1984); United Statex v. 
Maqee, 741 F.2d 93, 95 (5th Cir. 1984); Rubio v. Estelle, 689 
F.2d 533, 535 (5th Cir. 1982); United States v. Rankin, 779 F.2d 
956, 958 (3rd Cir. 1986); United States v. Norris, 780 F.2d 1207, 
1211 (5th Cir. 1986) (The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee 
defendants the right to counsel of their choice). The Tenth 
Circuit court in Nichols next addressed the denial of counsel of 
choice by a court's refusal to grant a continuance requested to 
provide new counsel. In that instance 
the court must balance a variety of factors, 
including the government's interest in the 
efficient administration of the trial and the 
defendant's interest in preserving chosen 
counsel, in deciding whether to grant a 
continuance. . . . The trial court is 
afforded broad discretion in deciding whether 
to grant a continuance. 
Nichols, 841 F.2d at 1504 (citations omitted). The court 
referred to two other federal cases which listed factors to be 
weighed in determining whether a trial court abused its 
discretion in refusing to grant the continuance. 
The first case cited is United States v. Kelm, 827 F.2d 
1319 (9th Cir. 1987), in which the court said: 
The constitutional right of a criminal 
defendant to choose his own attorney, 
however, is limited to the "fair opportunity" 
to obtain counsel of his choice. . . . When a 
criminal defendant's constitutional right to 
secure counsel of his choice conflicts with 
the trial judge's discretionary power to deny 
continuances, the reviewing court must 
balance several factors in determining 
whether the trial court's conduct was "fair 
and reasonable." . . . 
827 F.2d at 1322 (footnote omitted). In a footnote the court 
listed those factors as 
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whether the continuance would inconvenience 
witnesses, the court, counsel, or the 
parties; whether other continuances have been 
granted; whether legitimate reasons exist for 
the delay; whether the delay is the 
defendant's fault; and whether a denial would 
prejudice the defendant. 
Id. at 1322, n. 2. 
In the other case cited in Nichols, United States v. 
Burton, 584 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert, denied, Burton v. 
United States, 439 U.S. 1069 (1979), the federal circuit court 
stated: 
[T]he right to retain counsel of one's own 
choice is not absolute. The right "cannot be 
insisted upon in a manner that will obstruct 
an orderly procedure in courts of justice, 
and deprive such courts of the exercise of 
their inherent powers to control the same." 
The public has a strong interest in the 
prompt, effective, and efficient 
administration of justice; the public's 
interest in the dispensation of justice that 
is not unreasonably delayed has great force. 
584 F.2d at 489 (footnotes omitted). In analyzing the balance 
between the defendant's right and the public's right, the court 
listed some of the factors to consider as: 
the length of the requested delay; whether 
other continuances have been requested and 
granted; the balanced convenience or 
inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, 
counsel, and the court; whether the requested 
delay is for legitimate reasons, or whether 
it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; 
whether the defendant contributed to the 
circumstance which gives rise to the request 
for a continuance; whether the defendant has 
other competent counsel prepared to try the 
case, including the consideration of whether 
the other counsel was retained as lead or 
associate counsel; whether denying the 
continuance will result in identifiable 
prejudice to defendant's case, and if so, 
whether this prejudice is of a material or 
substantial nature; the complexity of the 
_u_ 
case; and other relevant factors which may 
appear in the context of any particular case. 
Id. at 490-91 (footnotes omitted). A similar list of factors is 
given in State v. Carman, 114 Idaho 791, 760 P.2d 1207, 1209 
(Idaho App. 1988) . 
Other state courts which have addressed the issue 
reiterate that the sixth amendment right to counsel is not an 
absolute right and "does not necessarily include the right to 
counsel of one's own choosing." Carman, 760 P.2d at 1209. 
Accord State v. Dukes, 34 Ohio App.3d 263, 518 N.E.2d 28, 32 
(Ohio App. 1986); State v. Sampley, 60 N.C. App. 493, 299 S.E.2d 
460, 462 (N.C.App. 1983); People v. Jeffers, 233 Cal.Rptr. 692, 
697, 188 Cal.App.3d 840 (Cal.App. 4 Dist. 1987); Harling v. 
United States, 387 A.2d 1101, 1104 (D.C.Ct.App. 1978); People v. 
Blake, 164 Cal.Rptr. 480, 483, 105 Cal.App.3d 619, 624-25 
(Cal.App. 1 Dist. 1980) ("a defendant who desires to retain his 
own counsel is required to act with diligence and may not demand 
a continuance if he is unjustifiably dilatory or if he 
arbitrarily desires to substitute counsel at the time of the 
trial"). 
In the present case, it is clear that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion by denying defendant's motion to 
continue on the morning of trial. Balancing the right of 
defendant with the public's right to the efficient administration 
of justice, the trial court acted fairly and reasonably. Using 
the factors cited in Burton, this Court can determine that the 
trial court's decision was correct. A previous request for 
continuance (by requesting the vacation of an earlier second 
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setting) made by defendant was granted; the witnesses, 
prospective jurors, counsel and the court were present and 
prepared for trial; the reasons given by defendant for the delay 
were insubstantial at best; the defendant was solely responsible 
for the circumstance which gave rise to the request by not 
seeking alternate counsel earlier; defendant had other competent 
counsel present and ready to defend him; no identifiable 
prejudice would result to defendant from the denial of the 
continuance; the case was rather straightforward, without complex 
facts; and defendant's original counsel was prepared to go 
forward. 
Defendant wanted new counsel but watted until the 
morning of trial to inform the court of that fact,, Original 
counsel had served defendant for seven months, and defendant had 
not earlier expressed any dissatisfaction. Defendant's stated 
grounds of complaint were negligible, consisting only of a 
complaint that counsel had not kept defendant from serving a jail 
term for an unrelated matter, and that counsel had not gotten a 
reduction of his charge. Such a reduction of charge was 
obviously not forthcoming considering that the codefendant, who 
in the testimony at trial demonstrated less culpability, was 
unable to achieve a lesser charge. These complaints did not show 
good cause for a very belated request for continuance to allow 
substitution of counsel. 
This is not a case where defendant was denied the able 
assistance of counsel at trial. The denial of the continuance 
did not leave defendant without counsel; he had the assistance of 
competent counsel who presented the best defense possible given 
the extensive evidence against defendant. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests 
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 5 ^ ^ day of February, 
1990. 
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2 (NOVEMBER 21, 1988.) 
3 (CONFERENCE IN CHAMBERS.) 
4 THE COURT: THIS IS THE CASE 3710, CRIMINAL 
5 CACHE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH VERSUS TRACY VAL KENDRICK AND 
6 SHAYNE EDWARD RHODES. I BELIEVE, MR. LAURITZEN, IT WAS 
7 YOUR POSITION THAT YOU WANTED SOMETHING ON THE RECORD. 
8 MR. LAURITZEN: WELL, MR. RHODES APPARENTLY 
9 WANTS TO EXPRESS HIMSELF FOR THE COURT. AND IT WAS 
10 GENERALLY FELT BY COUNSEL IT SHOULD BE OUTSIDE THE JURY, 
11 DEPENDING ON WHAT THE COURT'S RULING IS. SO BASICALLY, 
12 SHAYNE, IT'S YOUR TURN TO TALK. 
13 MR. RHODES: WELL, I FELT I NEEDED TO GET ME 
14 A NEW LAWYER BECAUSE I WAS IN JAIL FOR SIX MONTHS. ARDEN 
15 DIDN'T MAKE ANY MOTIONS TO HELP ME. AND I WENT DOWN TO 
16 TALK TO LAWYERS DOWN IN SALT LAKE. WENT AND TALKED TO 
17 GILBERT ATHAY AND HE TOLD ME IT WOULD BE BETTER TO 
18 DISMISS ARDEN, AND COME UP TO YOU AND TELL YOU I DON'T 
19 HAVE ANY COUNSEL BECAUSE HE CAN'T — HE'S ISN'T READY TO 
20 TRY THE CASE. 
21 THE COURT: THIS SEEMS TO BE PRETTY 
22 INAPPROPRIATE TIME ON THE DAY OF TRIAL WITH A JURY OUT 
23 HERE TO DECIDE YOU NOW NEED ANOTHER LAWYER. 
24 MR. RHODES: I DECIDED TWO DAYS AFTER I GOT 
25 OUT OF JAIL. I HADN'T TALKED TO ARDEN SINCE I GOT OUT. 
1 
1 I WENT AND TALKED TO HIM. 
2 THE COURT: WHY DIDN'T YOU DO SOMETHING ABOUT 
3 IT THEN? 
4 I MR. RHODES: I DID AS SOON AS I GOT A CHANCE. 
5 THE COURT: YOU HAVEN'T DONE ANYTHING AS FAR 
6 AS THIS COURT IS CONCERNED. HAVE TO HAVE POSITION OF 
7 ANOTHER COUNSELOR OR SHOW WITHDRAWAL OF YOUR PRESENT 
8 COUNSEL. 
9 MR. RHODES: GILBERT ATHAY DID TRY TO CONTACT 
10 YOU. 
11 THE COURT: THE OFFICE HAS NEVER BEEN 
12 CONTACTED BY MR. ATHAY. 
13 MR. RHODES: HE TALKED TO YOUR SECRETARY. 
14 THE COURT: THE COURT HAS NEVER BEEN 
15 CONTACTED BY HIM. THIS SEEMS TO BE JUST A METHOD OF 
16 DELAY. MR. LAURITZEN HAS A GOOD REPUTATION. HE IS A 
17 VERY EXCELLENT CRIMINAL ATTORNEY. YOU'VE GIVEN ME NO 
18 REASON TO SHOW WHY HE'S INCOMPETENT OR WHAT HE HASN'T 
19 DONE. 
20 MR. RHODES: WELL, THERE'S NOTHING ON MY 
21 RECORD THAT HE HAS DONE TO HELP ME OUT. 
22 THE COURT: NOTHING HE'S DONE TO HELP YOU OUT? 
23 HERE'S THE TRIAL. WHEN YOU GET TO TRIAL IS WHEN YOU 
24 NEED HIS HELP. 
25 MR. RHODES: TRACY'S LAWYERS TRIED TO GET A 
2 
1 CHANGE OF CHARGE. ARDEN DIDN'T DO NOTHING FOR ME. 
2 THE COURT: WERE THEY SUCCESSFUL IN DOING 
3 ANYTHING LIKE THAT? 
4 II MR. RHODES: NO, THEY WEREN'T. BUT HE STILL 
5 COULD HAVE TRIED. 
6 THE COURT: YOU COME IN AT THIS TIME OF TRIAL 
7 AND SO THIS IS THE REASON YOU WANT TO CONTINUE, TO GET 
8 ANOTHER ATTORNEY? 
9 MR. RHODES: I JUST DON'T FEEL HE'S DONE 
10 ANYTHING FOR ME AND I DON'T FEEL HE WILL. I FEEL I'M 
11 GOING IN HERE — 
12 THE COURT: YOUR PURPOSES AND YOUR ACTIONS 
13 SPEAK A LOT LOUDER THAN WORDS. THIS IS SIMPLY FOR THE 
14 PURPOSE OF DELAY. I WILL DENY YOUR MOTION TO CONTINUE 
15 AND I WON'T RELEASE YOUR ATTORNEY. ANYTHING ELSE. 
16 MR. LAURITZEN: I HAVE NOTHING. 
17 MR. JENKINS: FOR THE RECORD, DID YOU GUYS 
18 RECEIVE THE MEMORANDUM DECISION ON THE MOTION FOR 
19 BIFURCATION? I'VE GOT A PREPARED ORDER OUT THERE. 
20 MR. HAWKES: BUT WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE 
21 COURT'S CLERK I GUESS IT WAS DENIED. 
22 MR. JENKINS: ALL RIGHT. 
23 THE COURT: IT DOESN'T PRECLUDE EACH OF YOU 
24 FROM EACH HAVING YOUR OWN CHALLENGES, HOWEVER. 
25 MR. JENKINS: THEY ARE GOING TO ALL HAVE 
3 
DOUBLE CHALLENGES TO WHAT THE PROSECUTION HAS. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. JENKINS: I DON'T HAVE ANYTHING ELSE 
RIGHT NOW. 
THE COURT: ANYBODY ELSE. 
MR. LAURITZEN: NOTHING. 
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